Notes from Ditchley

I returned a few ago from a very interesting conference at Ditchley on the Western Balkans. The discussions with policy makers and analysts did not raise any radical new ideas, but it was good opportunity to take the temperature on thinking about and from the region. It was also a lesson in bad metaphors. Many felt that carrots and sticks are not working, but theories why differed: People in the Balkans prefer meat to carrots or the carrot is actually a stick. Either way, the days of carrots and sticks seems to be over (nobody mentioned that the metaphor implies that the person in question is either a horse or a donkey).

There was broad consensus that overall things were heading in the right direction, but there were a number of warnings: many (but not all) thought that the state of democracy & rule of law and lack of deep rooted reforms in the economy will continue to be a source of difficulties in the years to come. There was a bit of a divide between a number of Western policy makers who felt that the EU and its member states were doing enough to bring the countries of the region into the EU and that it was up to political elites to make an extra effort and a number of analysts who thought the EU should do more and make the membership perspective more realistic. A specific suggestion was for the EU to begin accession talks with all countries of the region as soon as possible rather than wait for each country on their own to fulfill the specific conditions. Once talks begin–the symbolic year of 2014 was mentioned as start date–the negotiation process will force countries to shape up and carry out reforms in a manner that is unrealistic prior to the beginning of talks. It seemed clear that such a scenario is unrealistic at the moment with a many member states skeptical about enlargement and afraid (although unjustifiably so–see Turkey) that accession talks would lead to membership ‘on the sneak’. A problem that has become more pronounced in recent years is the use of individual member states to use the accession process to set additional conditions. This has made the accession process less predictable as the Commission cannot guarantee the next step in the process as individual countries might block whatever comes next for unexpected reasons that have little to do with accession. Of course, this also undermines the credibility of EU accession. The current approach of the Commission to launch dialogues with countries without accession talks has been a good way forward but without beefing up the DG Enlargement this cannot be expanded more broadly.

The most encouraging signals came over the Serbia-Kosovo talks which are expected to lead to some tangible conclusions before the summer and when the current window of opportunity might close. On the other hand, Bosnia was much discussed, but there were few new ideas on how to help the country out of its current deadlock.

I found it encouraging that there is a clear sense that incrementalism is the way forward, there is not going to be a big bang, but rather small steps that will change the region and resolve the open questions. For this to be successful, one needs to overcome the dynamics of what one participants aptly called the EU member states pretending to enlarge and elites in the Western Balkans pretending to reform.

Who won the Montenegrin elections?

I participated in a workshop on the state of the Western Balkans last week in Munich organized by the Hanns-Seidel Foundation, the party foundation of the Bavarian Christian Democrats. As a speaker noted that in Montenegro there has not been a change of government through elections since 1945 (a point I have made as well), an unnamed gentleman sitting next to me whispered in my ear “This is just like in Bavaria!” The location, the “Franz Joseph Strauss Saal” made the comment even more appropriate. There are some differences between Bavaria and Montenegro, however. A political system with a single party dominance can be more easily compatible with a consolidated democracy when a region of a larger state is in question. At least national politics brings about changes of government. It could thus be argued that the lack of change of government (at least not through elections), indeed a feature of Montenegro, has become a more serious deficiency of the political system once Montenegro become independent. However, looking a the result of the most recent parliamentary elections suggests that this is not about to change.

As the election results came in, both the government and opposition celebrated their victory. The opposition of course did not win the largest share of the votes, but it celebrated for depriving the governing coalition of their absolute majority. So who really won?

It is true that the governing DPS and its partners (SDP and the Liberal Party) lost their absolute majority in these elections, but considering them as losers would be getting the numbers wrong. First, having won 46.3% of the vote and 39 of 41 seats necessary to form a government means that the current governing parties are still doing extremely well. A comparison with previous elections also shows that the loss of the governing coalition is insubstantial. Since 2002, i.e. for ten years, the ruling parties have gained nearly identical numbers of votes (between 164,000 and 168,000). This variation of less than 2.5% of the vote over a ten year period is a striking sign of stability and the ability of the DPS and its allies to mobilize a very stable and large segment of the electorate. From this point of view, the elections in 2012 were worse than in 2009, but better than 2006. Thus, there is clearly no defeat visible here. If we look now at the largest opposition party, we find considerably more variation over time. The lowest point is reached in 2006 when the opposition is divided between pro-Yugoslav (whatever that meant at the time), Serb national and technocratic-economic camps. The opposition has left this low point now firmly behind, but it remains weaker than the SNP was as the main opposition party in 2001 and 2002. While the Democratic Front might signal the increasing ability of the opposition to form a joint platform and focus on issues other than identity politics, the odds of winning elections without a change in DPS seems difficult to imagine considering its very steady electoral base.

 

Croatia’s EU prospects and voices from the past

The conclusion of negotiations between Croatia and the European Commission is great news for the region. After nearly six years of talk, this crucial period of EU accession for Croatia has been completed. There is little doubt that Croatia will manage to join within around two years due to the cumbersome ratification process (note for any politician in the region: if it takes 8 years for Croatia between beginning talks and membership, it’s unlikely to be faster anywhere else.

Now the question is how to “sell” accession to the current member states. Here, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in a commentary today [paywall] clearly heads into the wrong direction. The author writes “In some [European] capitals, the candidate Croatia is considered a Balkan country and a corner stone of Tito’s Yugoslavia.” He goes on to note that the “former Hungarian crown land is as central European as Slovenia and resisted Belgrade’s Serb hegemony.” While the comment notes that the difference between Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim sozialisation (whatever that means) is not a source of conflict in the EU, they are not irrelevant when it comes to national specificities (Eigenheiten). Implicitly, the comment suggests that Croatia completes the European Union rather than opening the door to the inclusion of the rest of the “Western Balkans”: Every inclusion is also an exclusion of those who are not joining at the same time. To argue that Croatia is joining due to its Catholic and central European nature is not only doing the EU a disservice which is more than a club of Central and West European countries, but it also challenges the process of enlargement over the past decade and serves cheap and rather dated Balkan stereotypes (recently revived thanks to the Greek crisis). Finally, it also throws an ugly light on the way on way the FAZ has been commenting on the dissolution of Yugoslavia exactly twenty years ago with offensive commentaries by Johann Georg Reissmüller which lacked any critical distance towards the Tudjman regime and in its blatant Balkan stereotyping.

 

Negotiating Division and Cooperation in today’s Bosnia

As Bosnia is recovering from the latest crisis, once more the largest one since Dayton, it is useful to reflect on the underlying challenges Bosnia is facing today. When late Richard Holbrooke brokered the Dayton Peace Accords in late 1995, most attention was devoted to drawing the new internal boundaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth Bosnia) to arrive at the “magical formula” which implemented the previously agreed division of the country into 49 percent under control of the Serb Republic (RS) and 51 percent under control of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), the predominantly Bosniak and Croat entity. Thus emerged an over 1000 km long border know euphemistically as the inter-entity boundary line (IEBL). On the other hand, the constitution and new institutions of the country received only scant attention during the negotiations. It is thus not without irony that it is those institutions which have been at the core of the profound political crisis which Bosnia has been slipping into over the past five years, while the borders have remained relatively uncontested.

Does this mean that too much attention has been placed to borders and too little to institutions? While certainly the institutions established at Dayton were often flawed, the border drawing was controversial and remains potentially a source of contestation. The boundary between the two entities largely followed the ceasefire line and only contained two major adjustments: One in western Bosnia to accommodate the 49/51 formula by placing thinly populated regions under control of the RS and granting the Federation full control over parts of Sarajevo previously under Bosnian Serb rule—a territorial transfer which came about with last chapter of ethnic cleansing with most Serbs leaving the neighborhoods under pressure from the RS leadership in March 1996.

The border between the entities has become largely invisible over the past 15 years: In the first years, many feared crossing the border and police check points in the vicinity of the border constituted efforts by the entities to prevent people from moving freely within Bosnia. Even if the police were absent, this invisible line became visible by stalls selling cheap cigarettes from the other entity and taxi drivers waiting for customers from the other side as few were willing to cross this line with the wrong license plates. With a common currency and a unified license plate, and a decline in the profitability of the cross-entity cigarette trade, the most visible reminders today are the large signs reading “Welcome to the Republic of Srpska”.

With few exceptions, the IEBL has also become the ethnic dividing line in Bosnia. Prior to the war, most municipalities were multinational, with a significant share of the population hailing not just the largest, but also from other groups. The ethnic cleansing during the war largely destroyed this diversity and territorialized ethnic belonging. The internationally administered return process was possibly the largest experiment to undo the consequences of ethnic cleansing. Refugees and internally displaced did not only have an unconditional right to return (unlike what seems currently likely in either Cyprus or Palestine/Israel), but were also assisted if they did want to go back home.  Even if (on paper) half of the two million IDPs and refugees returned (the return process has slowed to a trickle since 2003), the returnees often did not stay or became a new minority, marginalized when it comes to jobs, education and services. Only three municipalities bucked the trend and ‘changed hands’ since the end of the war. Grahovo, Drvar, Glamoč in Western Bosnia today have Serb majorities, as they did before the war, although they lie in a Federation canton named after the Croat secessionist project ‘Herceg Bosna.’ The main reason that these municipalities saw such massive returns after the war was due to the overwhelming Serb population majority they had before the war and the fact that Serbs were expelled from the region only towards the end of the war in 1995. These three towns are thus the exceptions which prove the rule that ethnic cleansing has largely worked.

The internal borders of Bosnia are today less physical markers, but continue firmly separate political power and cementing ethnic divisions. A second category of borders in Bosnia are the external borders with its three neighbors Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. Here a two-level border regime emerged. The physical border became more substantial since 1995 as Bosnia’s border regime evolved and it is likely to increase in significance as Croatia’s EU accession will lead, if not immediately, to a Schengen border between the two countries. On the hand, there is an ethnic border regime: The overwhelming number of Croats in Bosnia hold Croatian passports and a growing, but unknown number of Serbs in the RS have been acquiring Serbian passports. According to the Gallup Balkan Monitor in 2009 and 2010, 15.4 and 7.5% respectively of surveyed inhabitants hold a Serbian passport, n the Federation, 15.2% and 33.8% respectively hold the Croat citizenship.

This trend was certainly encouraged by the one year gap between the EU decision to liberalize the visa regime for Serbian (2009) and Bosnian citizens (2010). Beyond formal dual citizenship, other informal privileges granted to Croats or inhabitants of the RS create a virtual ethnic trans-border community. There are two ways of looking at this reality. Often, the ethnic ties are seen as a negative hold-over from the war years and help to undermine the already weak Bosnian state cohesion. These networks produce and reproduce loyalties and identities which can challenge the Bosnian state. This is exemplified by statements from the current president of the RS, Milorad Dodik, in which he stated that “case that tomorrow Bosnia and Serbia would play, I would cheer for Serbia.” Accordingly, only 15.8% of inhabitants in the RS support the Bosnian football team, while 75.8% in the Federation do. Forging closer ties to Serbia and fostering informal cross-border ties also reduced the identification with Bosnia. A consequence is the large support (over 80%) among Serbs in the RS support the independence of their entity over the continued existence of Bosnia.

Alternatively, one could also interpret these ties as having a moderating effect. In 2009, Tim Judah, the Balkan correspondent of The Economist coined the term Yugosphere. This Yugosphere describes the network of ties with the countries of former Yugoslavia in business and culture which have emerged since the end of the wars. They do not express a desire to re-constitute a political unit called Yugoslavia, but rather describe an alternative within the framework of existing states. Now, in addition to the Yugosphere, there are also a ‘Croatosphere’, and a ‘Serbosphere’. These are cross-border networks based on affinity along national lines. These ties are fostered by the above mentioned examples of state policies, including citizenship regimes, and create a sense of community. If the Yugosphere does not necessarily present a challenge to the existing states, it could be argued that the national spheres similarly provide for another layer of identity, but do not have to undermine multi-national states per se. It could be argued that these linkages provide for multiple centres and networks, which might reduce the degree of contestation over only one, namely the state.

The challenge for Bosnia arising from the ‘Croatopshere’ and the ‘Serbosphere’ is that these often enjoy more legitimacy and have been able to provide greater benefits to Bosnian citizens which partake in these alternative spheres, including freedom to travel and jobs, than the state. Moreover, these spheres are exclusive and the largest Bosnian community, Bosniaks, lack such a comparable dimension. Most importantly, unlike the Yugosphere, the national spheres often (but not necessarily) challenge the legitimacy of the state and thus constitute an alternative rather than an additional layer to identity among Bosnians.

Both transnational and subnational structures and networks have been unable to overcome or to short-circuit the cumbersome decision-making processes within Bosnia. While there is widespread agreement that institutions in Bosnia which require consent across national lines have struggled to take decisions for years. The frequency of blockages increased since 2006 when Milorad Dodik came to power in the Republika Srpska for a second time and pursued a confrontational line towards the international actors and Bosniak parties. The fact that neither the state nor the Federation have had a government for more than four months after the elections in October 2010 is indicative of the tense political environment. The reason for the political blockages can be easily attributed to, depending on the perspective, the President of the RS, Milorad Dodik, or Bosniak politicians insisting on a further centralization of the state. The modest legislative record of the Bosnian parliament in recent years and the slow government formation cannot, however, are not caused only by a particular politician, or a particular elite.

Instead, it might be tempting to shift all the blame to the power-sharing arrangement established at Dayton. With its emphasis on ethnicity and strong linkage between ethnicity and territory, it seems to a recipe for confrontational ethnopolitics. Nevertheless, it is equally misleading to consider the entire political system as source of the current crisis in Bosnian politics.

While it is true , that just as there are populist politicians which thrive on the current impasse, there are institutions with multiple veto points and excessive emphasis on ethnic representation, colloquially known in Bosnia as “counting blood cells”, i.e. predetermining peoples professional opportunities based on their ethnic belonging. In order to find out why Bosnia is struggling, we need to explore other causes.

As survey for UNDP in 2007 found Bosnia to be at the bottom of international leagues when it comes to social trust. Only 7.8% of surveyed citizens indicate that they trust others, considerably lower than other countries, including in South Eastern Europe. This low level of trust transfers into low levels of trust in institutions and low level of interest in politics, again significantly less than in any country in the region. What is striking about the findings is that Bosnia is less characterized by low levels of trust between ethnic groups, or by particular groups towards some institutions—by Serbs towards the state for example—but by a generally low level of trust, not ethnically neutral, but preferences along ethnic lines are overshadowed by the general breakdown in trust.

Considering this backdrop, it is not surprising that Bosnia has essentially become a “low trust state”. The institutions are predicated on the low trust along ethnic lines: Veto rights and blocking mechanisms are the embodiment of low levels of trust in political opponents (sometimes justified). International supervision since Dayton has often interfered into political decisions due to low trust in local political elites (often for good reason). The political discourse of elites has been based on the rhetoric of low trust: A key theme of Milorad Dodik’s party SNSD over recent years has been the need to preserve the RS against threats from Bosniak parties and international pressure. The supposed threat and low trust in both parties from other ethnic groups and international actors were the core message. Similarly, Dodik recently rejected the introduction of a new article in the Bosnian constitution, known as the “Europe clause” which would allow for laws essential to EU integration to pass with fewer veto rights. Similarly, Croat parties have emphasized the need for a third entity to protect Croat interests from being marginalized. Finally, predominantly Bosniak parties emphasize their distrust toward the RS and the intentions of the non-Bosniak parties towards the state. While most citizens’ distrust is not primarily ethnic, the distrust of parties has clear ethnic overtones. If the goal of parties with a mono-ethnic electorate is to generate loyalty within the ethnic group at the expense of interethnic relations, the parties in Bosnia have failed. If, however, the ethnic distrust is both a way to channel broader frustration and a mechanism to re-produce distrust, it has worked. The effect of distrust is disengagement from politics and helps to sustain parties that re-affirm low trust politics and, while not being particularly trusted themselves, direct high levels of distrust elsewhere.

The Bosnian system of government is thus characterized by the tension between the different types of distrust: the distrust by citizens, as captured by surveys, is based on the perception of corruption and abuse of office, as well as by the inability of the state (and sub-state units) to deliver services citizens expect, such as health care, social protection and employment. The low levels of trust along ethnic lines, as promoted by most political parties, on the other hand reinforces ineffective institutions and legitimizes the (ab)use of office to further a particular mono-ethnic agenda, often in conjunction with party and individual interests. The two different sources of low trust in Bosnia thus are seemingly disconnected, yet mutually reinforcing. This has made institutional change and the emergence of new elites more difficult in Bosnia than in neighboring countries. Although low levels of trust are not a given, they are part of the DNA of Dayton Bosnia.

What does this experience tell us about post-conflict institutions and international intervention?

First, if the institutions have as many veto points as in Bosnia (a law proposed by government can be blocked in at least four different ways by both entities and “constituent people” before being passed), the risks of blockages increases and the state fails to deliver, further undermining the legitimacy of the state.

Second, if the state lacks incentives for cooperation and instead constantly has to compete with national ‘spheres’ or sub-state units which can govern in the absence of multiethnic decision making, the prospects for elites finding an interest in making institutions work decreases.

Third, without islands of ‘success’, where the state can generate trust and legitimacy, the underperformance of the state only helps to legitimize alternative state projects.

Fourth, while political contestation might often have ethnic overtones, social concerns are shaped by fear, distrust and low levels of social cohesion, with limited ethnic dimensions. In brief, the causes for ethnic politics might not be found in ethnicity, but in other dimensions of alienation and exclusion.

Is Libya like Serbia 1999?

The Serbian football trainer Branko Smiljanić said in an interview that Tripoli today reminds of Belgrade in 1999. He went on to say that the similarities lies in the fact that life goes on largely as normal despite the bombing. A number of facebook groups have sprung up, such as the “Support for Muammar al Gaddafi from the people of Serbia” with over 32,000 ‘likes’ as of 21 March. The group also features photos from a protest in favor of Gaddafi in front of the 25 May museum and Tito’s mausoleum. The supporters of Gaddafi thus blend Yugonostalgia and the close Libyan-Yugoslav ties during the socialist period with the more recent past.

So does the 1999/2011 comparison hold? Neil Clark in the Guardian argued that March is a time of lies which lead to the UK involvement in Kosovo 1999, Iraq 2003, and Libya 2011. His argument that all three interventions are based on (potential) lies is of course simplistic and the assertion that Kosovo and Iraq were “classic imperialist ventures whose real aim was to extend western economic and military hegemony” suggest a simplistic argument based on some supposed “anti-imperial” reflex. I am not sure how and why the “West” has spread its hegemony in Kosovo or Serbia through military intervention. Just like protesters for Gaddafi, it ignores the target of the intervention amidst obsession with supposed imperialism.

So if this is not convincing, what are the similarities and difference? First, Libyan intervention in 2011 has been based on a UN Sec. Council Resolution, whereas in Kosovo such as mandate was elusive due to Russian and Chinese opposition. Intervention in Kosovo followed a conflict which began  to take a violent turn already a year earlier, in March 1998. A key difference between the two intervention is the group protected. Albanians were targeted by the Milosevic regime in 1998/9 as it considered Albanians potential supporters for the KLA and for supporting secession from Serbia. In Libya the opposition is by all indications not interested in seceding from Libya, but overthrowing Gaddafi and establishing a  democracy and a protection of human rights (even if we know very little about the actual composition of the opposition itself).

One argument put forth in 1999 was the ‘moral hazard’ argument: By supporting the KLA, the intervention rewarded the use of force for a secessionist movement. While over the past decade there is little evidence the de facto support for the KLA has emboldened secessionist groups around the world to take up arms, there is a problem associated with supporting the use of force (the main problem has been the lack of support for its non-violent alternatives). In Libya, there is no such moral hazard. It potential democrats are emboldened to overthrow dictators by the intervention, this cannot be considered problematic per se (although military intervention is likely to remain rare and it might encourage rebellion when odds of  success and intervention are both slim). The hazard would have been greater if there had been no intervention, the message would be clear to other dictators: be soft and you end up as Ben Ali and Mubarak, be brutal and you can stay in power.

Both interventions are imperfect in their own way. It is very difficult to predict the outcome and length of the conflict ensuing. Once intervention begins, it is impossible to ascertain whether the alternative of non-intervention would have resulted in fewer victims or less repression. There has been little time for planning for this intervention and besides the  UN Sec. Council resolution which talks about what needs to end (repression of human rights), and a change which reflects the will of the people, but it is unclear how to get there. In Kosovo there was little and poor post-conflict planning, leading for mass violence at the end of the war and anarchy which helped undermine legitimacy of the post-conflict peace building. At this point, the conflict in Libya is not yet a long standing civil war where a serious post-conflict intervention would be justified (and it is explicitly excluded by the resolution). As imperfect as interventions are, the ability of dictators to militarily repression opposition deserves to be curtailed, especially when they are as violent and heavy handed as Gaddafi.

 

Europe’s Silence

Much attention has been devoted to the difficulty of the US administration to deal with rapidly changing events in Tunisia and Egypt. However, the European Union has been equally struggling in endorsing the popular demand for reform and democracy in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere in the region. While Europe might have less of a military investment in the region, the repercussions of instability in the Middle East might be more direct–beginning with potential refugee flows. At the same time, more than half of the EU experienced democratic revolutions in during the past generation: Not only the countries of Central Europe, but also Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Greece) saw the ouster of dictatorships governing in the name of stability in the past 35 years. The countries can be a model for the Middle East and while overthrowing tested and tried dictators always brings with it uncertainty, the European Union at its core should understand the demands of citizens in the Middle East for greater rights and democracy.

It is thus a great pity, that the EU has not seized the moment to support the pro-democracy movements in the region more vocally. Sharing the know how and the advantage of democracy and the rule of law are after all the greatest export the EU can offer.

5 October = 1 February? Or how the regime will end in Egypt

The mass protests called for today remind of the demonstrations organized by the Serbian opposition against the Milosevic regime on 5 October 2000. A make or break confrontation which will force the hand of those sitting on the fence. So what are the possible scenarios now?

1. The protests peter out: Revolution aborted

This is what the regime hopes. The demonstrations will exhaust themselves, increasingly disunited over what to do will just fade away. Afterward the regime cracks down on opposition. While this might be plausible which much smaller demonstrations, the number of people on the street just seems to large for this scenario.

2. The protesters will take over: A Revolution

The protesters will take over institutions and push Mubarak out. Mubarak has to flee if he does not want to risk his life. Such a fully fledged revolution seems equally unlikely as there are too many actors who have in the past supported the regime and will have an interest in preventing a total collapse of the old system. In particular the army has retained sufficient legitimacy to remain a relevant institution.

3. Protesters are attacked: Tiananmen scenario

Security forces suppress mass protests violently, considering the number of protesters the violence against the demonstrators has to be substantial to have any chance of success. Considering the army declaring its support for the grievances of the demonstrators, such a scenario would suggest that those using force would be themselves coming under attack, probably by the army. Thus, this would be more like the Romania 1989 scenario than China 1989. The use of force would also prevent those committing it to have some part in the new regime. In effect, at this point only those with nothing to lose would be candidates.

4. Protestors succeed: 5 October

The protesters show by their numbers that the old regime has lost all legitimacy, they take over crucial symbols of the old regime (TV?) and force the hand of those hedging their bets. As they change sides, the old regime crumbles.

What happens today does not depend on Mubarak, and maybe not so much on protesters either (as long as they show in large numbers), but on those members of the old regime who will have to decide which way to go today. If they decide that Mubarak has no future (which seems pretty obvious), there will be little space for Mubarak to continue.

The challenge might be of what happens on 2 February. In Serbia, 6 October has become the metaphor of the incomplete revolution–the unsavory deals made to secure the end of the Milosevic regime. While such a  Pacted Transition (as in Spain) has greater chances of leading to stable new government and prospects for democracy are better, there is a risk that many Egyptian might feel like the protests did not bring the change they hoped for. This, however, is a topic for another day.

The Otpor connection in Egypt

When I was following some tweets on Egypt, I was struck when I came across the symbol of Otpor. Subsequently I noticed that a number of protesters also using the Otpor symbol. The obvious question is whether this use of symbols was coincidental and some movements or protesters in Egypt were just inspired by Otpor or whether there are stronger links. A number of Serbian news sources of varying quality (Alo, Vesti Online) have now published articles suggesting that former Otpor activists have been training some opposition groups, including interviews with anonymous former Otpor members and the Serbian embassy. The main group in question seems to be April 6, launched first as a facebook group. The group has currently over 87,000 members and has been active for nearly three years already. According to recently released wikileaks documents, the group appears to have enjoyed some support from the US government, but the assessment of the US state department interloctutor in late 2008 is telling: The 6 April representative “offered no roadmap of concrete steps toward April 6′s highly unrealistic goal of replacing the current regime with a parliamentary democracy prior to the 2011 presidential elections. Most opposition parties and independent NGOs work toward achieving tangible, incremental reform within the current political context, even if they may be pessimistic about their chances of success. xxx wholesale rejection of such an approach places him outside this mainstream of opposition politicians and activists.” It seems like recent events have shown that the assessment of the group was more astute than the US state department.

Clearly, the main inspiration for the protests came from Tunisia, not Serbia, but the Otpor connection is telling for two reasons: First, it demonstrates that pro-democracy movements are linked across continents and lessons are learned. Second, the wikileaks cable shows that the US state department was in communication with opposition to the Mubarak regime already in 2008. It thus seems simplistic to accuse the government of just propping up Mubarak without listening to alternatives. The Otpor connection also suggests that there was at least some level of financial support for opposition groups from the US, even if it wasn’t the administration directly.

 

Tunisia and Egypt: Lessons from 1989 and the Colored Revolutions

Before the demonstrations in Egypt gathered momentum in Egypt, I wrote a short analysis of events in Tunisia, which is published in today’s Presse. In it I argue that the likelihood the fall of the Ben Ali regime will lead to democracy depends on a number factors, including the neighborhood, the larger geopolitical environment and a shared domestic goal. In particular, the regional context matters. Democratization processes are considerably more difficult if the country is surrounded by authoritarian regimes which all hope for the experiment in democracy to fail (see esp. in Kyrgyzstan). If the whole neighborhood goes, not all countries might succeed, but the old model of authoritarianism is clearly no longer acceptable. Thus, I would argue for Tunisia to have a good shot at democratizing, it’s example needs to be emulated in the region.

League of Extraordinary Gentleman

The question now is whether the protests in the region will lead to 1989–the collapse of regimes in a domino across the region–or the colored revolutions of the 2000s when a few countries began democratizing (or rather restarted) but often remained in an undemocratic environment (Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan). There are strong reasons to believe that what we witness is more like 1989.

First, the trigger for the protests against the authoritarian regimes is not a rigged election, as was the case in Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia or Kyrgyzstan. Instead, it is general dissatisfaction with the system. Like Communist regimes, the autocrats in the Arab world have been increasingly unable to live up to the “bargain” they had offered. Stability and moderate increases in living standards for accepting authoritarian rule. The regimes have been increasingly unable to deliver.

Second, the age factor. The average age of the leaders of the Communist leaders in Eastern Europe in 1989 was 74. The average age of some of the Arab leaders  (Ben Ali, Mubark, Saleh, Gaddafi, Bouteflika) is close to 73. They represent a petrified a political system with little prospects for internal reform. While some countries have had younger leaders through dynastic succession (Assad, King Mohammed VI, King Abdallah), they represent the failure of the systems to fundamentally change from within.

Third, the demonstration effect suggests close links between the protests in the region. A protest in one country (Tunisia) helped break the fear in others. As it is not rigged elections which triggered the protests, the circumstances have also allowed the protests to spread rapidly. Once demonstrators lose the fear to go to the streets, the options of the regimes are severely limited.

None of these similarities mean that the regime will fall automatically. There is still the Tienanmen scenario for some regimes, while others might hope for protests to fizzle out. As they do not depend on a single backer (save for the US in a number of cases), like the Soviet Union, the links between the regimes are less immediate and the dominoes might not yet fall.

The unbearable lightness of being in power: 20 years multi-party democracy in former Yugoslavia

1990s is not only the last year before the beginning of the wars in former Yugoslavia, it is also the year in which multi-party elections were held in all republics of Yugoslavia. So twenty years later, where do things stand?

What is striking across the region is the endurance of a few parties in power. If we rank the countries by number of years out of 20 a party has been in power, we end up with the following:

1. Montenegro (DPS 20 of 20, 100%)

Montenegro’s DPS clearly wins the competition with not losing power once since 1990. It has only seen genuine threats to its power come from within.Prospects for continued rule of the DPS are good, once more change might only come from within.

2. Kosovo (LDK, 8 of 8, 100%)

Rugova’s LDK has been a member of a coalition government ever since the establishment of elected Kosovo institutions in 2002. However, as a coalition partner, it was never dominant during that period and it’s fortunes have declined steadily, being no longer the largest party. If we add the 1990s, when the LDK dominated until 1997 absolutely among Albanian voters, dominance of the LDK fits the larger regional pattern.

3. Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ & SDA, 18 of 20, 90%)

Bosnia is tricky with a political system shaped by three distinct electorates with little cross-ethnic voting. HDZ and SDA have managed to be in power for 18 of the past 20 years, only being out of power less than two years in 2001/2 when the short lived Alliance for Change governed. Among Croat voters, the only real challengers to HDZ came from within, in particular since 2006 with the creation of HDZ1990. The persistence of SDA in power is less due to its unchallenged dominance, but due the coalition building dynamics in Bosnia. It has now a number of challenges, some older (SDP, SBiH), others more recent such as the SBB BiH, the party of the owner of Avaz, Randoncic. The third in the original triumvirate of nationalists, SDS, has been in power considerably less time (13 of 20 years).

4. Croatia (HDZ 17 of 20, 85%)

The dominance of HDZ is a striking feature of Croatian politics, held in check by a strong opposition, at least over the past decade. The brief SDP interlude 2000-2003 was also transformative in helping to shift Croatian political discourse towards EU integration. The popularity of President Josipovic suggests that HDZ’s days in power might be numbered.

5. Serbia (SPS 12/15 of 20, 60-75%)

SPS is the survivor among the long-lasting parties in power. Having had complete control for a decade, it came back to support the DSS led minority government 2004-2007 and as a junior partner in 2008. It also transformed itself so that now its president Ivica Dacic sometimes seems like one of the most progressive members of government. It’s also the only dominant party which has been in power both as a junior and as a senior partner.

6. Slovenia (LDS 12 of 20, 60%)

After having dominated governments continuously for 12 years, it is now a small party, eclipsed by others. Thus, this dominant party does not look like making a come back.

7. Macedonia (SDSM 10 of 20 and VMRO 8 of 20, 50%)

Macedonia has had the least clear pattern of a dominant party in the region, with the Social Democrats only governing for half the time. VMRO governed for nearly as long and the sometimes authoritarian reflexes of VMRO under Gruevski suggest that they are on their way to eclipse SDSM for the total duration in power.

Looking at the countries of former Yugoslavia, it is remarkable to which degree a few parties have dominated for most of the period since the first multi-party elections. This dominance has overall declined since the 1990s, but is still not broken in parts of the region. Thus, unlike in Central and Eastern Europe, governments were often booted out for either corruption or due painful reforms, parties in former Yugoslavia have overall been more successful in clinging to power, often with not so good results for the country.  What is encouraging is that with a few exceptions, no single party is so firmly in control that it could not lose power at the next elections.